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Honest Services Fraud and the Fiduciary Relationship 
Requirement: How the Ninth Circuit Got It Wrong 
in United States v. Milovanovic 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Honest services mail fraud1 is one of the more difficult white 
collar crimes to understand, mostly because, as Justice Scalia phrased 
it, prosecutors are “all over the place” in how they interpret it.2 Most 
attempts to clarify the statute’s meaning have only confused the legal 
community more. Yet, despite its ambiguity, many describe the 
statute as the prosecutor’s “true love”— his catch-all, go-to weapon 
against white collar criminals.3 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue 
of honest services fraud in United States v. Milovanovic.4 After 
falsifying paperwork for commercial drivers licenses in exchange for 
bribes, the defendants in Milovanovic were charged with honest 
services fraud.5 The defendants challenged the indictment, claiming 
that a fiduciary relationship6 between plaintiff and defendant is 
necessary for honest services fraud, and no such relationship existed 
 
 1. Honest services fraud refers to “a scheme or artifice to defraud” by “depriv[ing] 
another of the intangible right of honest services.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2006). It is a 
charge frequently used in public corruption cases. Thomas M. DiBiagio, Politics and the 
Criminal Process: Federal Public Corruption Prosecutions of Popular Public Officials Under the 
Honest Services Component of the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes, 105 DICK. L. REV. 57, 57 
(2000). 
 2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49–50, Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
2971 (2010) (No. 08-1196), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts /08-1196.pdf. 
 3. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 
(1980). 
 4. 627 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted, 655 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 5. Id. at 407. Specifically, the defendants were charged with mail fraud and conspiracy 
to commit mail fraud. Id. 
 6. A fiduciary relationship is one “in which one person is under a duty to act for the 
benefit of another on matters within the scope of the relationship.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1402 (9th ed. 2009). 
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between the defendants and their employers, the Washington State 
Department of Licensing.7 The Ninth Circuit ruled that a fiduciary 
relationship is not a sine qua non requirement of honest services 
fraud,8 making it the third circuit court to make this ruling.9 The 
case is currently set to be reheard en banc by the Ninth Circuit.10  
This Note will argue that Milovanovic was decided incorrectly, as 
the court failed to contemplate the policy considerations of 
discrimination, over-criminalization, and over-regulation of the 
private sector. Part II of this Note provides the history of the honest 
services fraud statute and more recent developments in the statute’s 
interpretation. Part III discusses the facts and procedural history of 
Milovanovic. In Part IV, this Note argues that the Ninth Circuit in 
Milovanovic disregarded several important policy considerations 
when eliminating the fiduciary relationship requirement—namely, 
discriminatory application, over-criminalization, and over-regulation 
of the private sector. With this recent ruling, prosecutors in the 
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction will effectively have unchecked discretion 
to prosecute almost anyone for almost anything remotely related to 
fraud. This reckless expansion of the already broad honest services 
fraud statute should—and must—be reversed when the Ninth 
Circuit rehears Milovanovic en banc. 
II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Early History 
The mail fraud statute, as amended in 1909, criminalized using 
the mail to advance “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises.”11 Over time, courts 
broadened the interpretation of “money or property” to include 
 
 7. Milovanovic, 672 F.3d at 408. 
 8. Id. at 413. 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 155 (2d Cir. 2003) (Raggi, J., 
concurring) (“While a particular relationship may shed light on whether one person owes 
another honest services, the language of § 1346 indicates that the critical factor is the type of 
service at issue, not the relationship of the parties.”); United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 
1036 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We reject the Ervastis’ contention that § 1346 requires the breach of a 
fiduciary duty . . . . [T]he breach of a fiduciary duty is not a necessary element of § 1346. 
Certainly nothing in . . . the language of either § 1341 or § 1346 suggests the contrary.”). 
 10. United States v. Milovanovic, 655 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
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deprivation of intangible rights such as honest services, a concept 
officially articulated in the 1941 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision of Shushan v. United States.12 
In Shushan, a public official accepted bribes in exchange for 
supporting a certain city contract.13 The city lost no money or 
property in the course of the fraud, but instead saved money.14 The 
public official was nevertheless convicted of mail fraud because “[n]o 
trustee has more sacred duties than a public official,” and taking 
advantage of this duty meant depriving the public of its right to an 
official’s honest services.15 Prosecutors subsequently began using 
deprivation of intangible rights, such as honest services, as the basis 
for charging defendants with fraud more frequently.16 Honest 
services became a catch-all deprivation when suspect behavior did 
not fall under the definition of another crime.17 The doctrine of 
intangible rights during this period was like an “exotic flower that 
quickly overgrew the legal landscape in the manner of the kudzu vine 
until . . . few ethical or fiduciary breaches seemed beyond its 
potential reach.”18 
The Supreme Court eventually addressed intangible rights in 
McNally v. United States, holding that mail and wire frauds only 
applied to schemes to defraud others of tangible property or 
money.19 The McNally decision called upon Congress to “speak 
more clearly” if it wanted to include honest services as a 
deprivation.20 One year later, in response to this request, Congress 
added language to the United States Code clarifying that “the term 
‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to 
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”21 
 
 12. Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941), overruled by United States 
v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 13. Id. at 114. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 115. 
 16. John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 430 (1998). 
 17. Id. at 463. 
 18. Id. at 427. 
 19. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4508. 
 20. Id. at 360. 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
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B. More Recent Approaches in the Private Sector 
Over the last twenty years, prosecutors have used the honest 
services fraud statute in the private sector much more frequently to 
respond to the complexities of corporate crime.22 United States v. 
Frost was not the first case to involve an honest services fraud charge 
in the private sector, but it is one of the most cited.23 In Frost, the 
defendants—two University of Tennessee professors who had aided 
student plagiarism—argued that they were not susceptible to honest 
services fraud prosecution because they were not public servants.24 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was not persuaded by their 
argument, holding that “private individuals . . . may commit mail 
fraud by breaching a fiduciary duty and thereby depriving the person 
or entity to which the duty is owed of the intangible right to the 
honest services of that individual.”25  
Since Frost, courts have dealt with the honest services fraud 
statute in various ways. The results have been both clarifying and 
confusing. First, the courts of appeals have developed two 
approaches to determining the scope of the honest services fraud 
statute: the reasonably foreseeable economic harm test and the 
materiality test. Second, in an effort to prevent vagueness, the 
Supreme Court has held that the honest services fraud statute only 
applies in cases involving bribery and kickbacks. Finally, the courts of 
appeals have split over the question of whether honest services fraud 
requires a breach of a fiduciary relationship. 
1. Reasonably foreseeable economic harm test versus materiality test 
Federal courts of appeals today generally use two approaches in 
private sector honest services cases: the reasonably foreseeable 
economic harm test and the materiality test.26 The reasonably 
foreseeable economic harm test requires the government to prove 
that an employee intentionally breached his fiduciary duty and 
“foresaw or reasonably should have foreseen that his employer might 
 
 22. Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties Through 
Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L., 1, 38 (2010). 
 23. 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 24. Id. at 365. 
 25. Id. at 366. 
 26. See, e.g., id. at 368. 
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suffer economic harm as a result of the breach.”27 The materiality 
test, on the other hand, requires that the government prove that the 
defendant fraudulently intended to make “any misrepresentation that 
has the natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing” 
the victim to change his behavior.28 The courts have acknowledged 
the existence of both tests and several have taken the opportunity in 
opinions to explain why one test is superior to the other.29 
2. Vagueness 
The Supreme Court has narrowed the honest services fraud 
statute’s application in order to prevent vagueness. A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague when it fails to “define the criminal offense 
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”30 Skilling v. United States 
addressed vagueness in the context of honest services fraud.31 
Skilling, the former CEO of Enron, was convicted in 2006 of honest 
services fraud and securities fraud.32 Skilling challenged the honest 
services conviction, arguing that § 1346 is unconstitutionally 
vague.33 The Supreme Court of the United States agreed and ruled 
in favor of Skilling.34 The Court kept the statute alive, however, by 
holding that § 1346 can still be used to prosecute crimes where a 
bribe or kickback is involved.35  
 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 
 29. For example, the Sixth Circuit reasons that the reasonably foreseeable harm test is 
better because it “properly focuses on the intent of the employee, and explicitly acknowledges 
[an] implicit assumption of the ‘materiality’ standard.” Frost, 125 F.3d at 368–69. In contrast,  
the Second Circuit feels that the materiality test “[arose] out of fundamental principles of the 
law of fraud,” while the reasonably foreseeable harm test is merely “something of an ipse dixit 
designed simply to limit the scope of section 1346.” United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 
146 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 30. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
 31. 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010). 
 32. Id. at 2907–11. 
 33. Id. at 2925. 
 34. Id. at 2907. 
 35. Id. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas noted in Skilling that they would have 
preferred to do away with the statute entirely rather than inventing limitations not present in 
the statute in order to keep it alive. Id. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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The Skilling decision was certainly a victory for criminal defense 
lawyers since it will prevent the government from prosecuting cases 
with no evidence of bribes or kickbacks under § 1346; however, the 
honest services fraud statute was not blunted beyond use. The 
definition of “kickbacks” could be interpreted so broadly that it 
would encompass most corruption cases that come before 
prosecutors anyway. The Court does not specify that a “kickback” 
must be monetary—it is possible a prosecutor could satisfy the 
kickback requirement by simply offering evidence of a quid pro quo 
agreement. The effects of this decision are only just starting to play 
out in the courts, so it is difficult to ascertain how much of an effect 
Skilling will have on honest services fraud cases. 
3. Fiduciary relationship requirement 
Today, the federal courts of appeals are also at odds in regard to 
the requirement of a breach of fiduciary relationship. The Third,36 
Fourth,37 Fifth,38 Sixth,39 and Eleventh40 Circuits have all held that 
honest services fraud requires the defendant to have breached a 
fiduciary duty to the victim, while the Second41 and Eighth Circuits42 
 
 36. United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting case law 
which held “that state law must provide the specific honest services owed by the defendant in a 
fiduciary relationship” (quoting U.S. v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 116 n.5 (2003))  
 37. United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Thus . . . we must 
assess whether there was sufficient evidence . . . to find that [one] willingly aided and 
participated in the breach of a fiduciary duty . . . , and that he could reasonably foresee that the 
breach would create an identifiable economic risk.”). 
 38. United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006) (“‘Honest services are 
services owed to an employer under state law,’ including fiduciary duties defined by the 
employer-employee relationship.”(quoting United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 409 (5th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 39. United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 366 (6th Cir. 1997) (“We therefore hold that 
private individuals . . . may commit mail fraud by breaching a fiduciary duty and thereby 
depriving the person or entity to which the duty is owed of the intangible right to the honest 
services of that individual.”). 
 40. United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]o prove 
‘honest services’ mail fraud, the Government must show that the accused intentionally 
participated in a scheme or artifice to deprive the persons or entity to which the defendant 
owed a fiduciary duty of the intangible right of honest services, and used the United States 
mails to carry out that scheme or artifice.”). 
 41. United States v. Sancho, 157 F.3d 918, 920 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Sancho contends that 
criminal liability . . . for a scheme to deprive another of honest services requires the existence of 
a ‘genuine fiduciary relationship’ to the entity being defrauded . . . . There is no such 
requirement.”), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
HUNTER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  11:45 AM 
509 United States v. Milovanovic 
 515 
have rejected such a requirement. The Ninth Circuit is the latest to 
join the Second and Eighth Circuits in rejecting this fiduciary 
requirement in United States v. Milovanovic.43 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Facts 
The defendant, Brano Milovanovic (Milovanovic), was indicted 
for honest services fraud along with four other codefendants.44 
Milovanovic and his cronies developed a scheme to help out-of-state 
Bosnian-Americans illegally obtain commercial drivers licenses in the 
state of Washington in exchange for bribes.45 Milovanovic was an 
independent contractor hired by the Washington State Department 
of Licensing as a Bosnian interpreter.46 During the course of his 
employment, Milovanovic gave applicants the answers to the written 
test portion of the license application, and he bribed the 
administrator of the driving test, another codefendant, to forge the 
test results.47 The defendants were not considered to be state 
employees, and their employment contracts specifically stated that 
Milovanovic and the other interpreters in question were not 
“agents” of the state.48 In fact, no specific paperwork existed to 
suggest that a fiduciary duty accompanied the relationship between 
the defendants and the state of Washington.49 
B. Procedural History 
The United States indicted the defendants for honest services 
fraud in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Washington.50 The defendants argued that a fiduciary relationship is 
 
 42. United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We reject the 
Ervastis’ contention that § 1346 requires the breach of a fiduciary duty. . . . [T]he breach of a 
fiduciary duty is not a necessary element of § 1346. Certainly nothing in . . . the language of 
either § 1341 or § 1346 suggests the contrary.”). 
 43. 627 F.3d 405 (2010), reh’g en banc granted, 655 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 44. Id. at 407. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 406. 
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a sine qua non of honest services fraud; the district court agreed and 
dismissed the indictment, basing its decision on the lack of a 
fiduciary relationship.51 The United States appealed in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.52 Upon taking the case, the Ninth Circuit 
was faced with the question of whether honest services fraud must be 
committed by a fiduciary, a question it answered with a resounding 
“no.”53 
The majority opinion reasoned that honest services fraud, found 
in Title 18, § 1346 of the United States Code, is an extension of the 
mail fraud statute found in § 1341.54 Thus, by reading the text of the 
two statutes together, it is evident that “[w]hoever having devised or 
intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud” by “depriv[ing] 
another of the intangible right of honest services” through the use of 
mail has committed honest services fraud.55 The use of the word 
“whoever” was especially significant to Judge Kleinfeld, who argued 
that Congress could have indicated here that the relevant sections 
would only apply to fiduciaries.56 However, Congress notably chose 
to use the much more broad term, “whoever,” which is indicative of 
its application to anyone guilty of such acts.57 
The majority opinion also relied on the purposes behind § 1346, 
which are to limit social harm and to prevent and punish fraud.58 
There is no suggestion, the majority reasoned, that this statute 
should only apply to fiduciaries; if there was such a requirement, the 
statute would not list counterfeiting as a type of fraud fitting within 
this definition.59 The majority explained that counterfeiting is not a 
fraud that involves a fiduciary relationship.60 In fact, there are several 
types of traditional mail fraud that do not involve a fiduciary 
relationship.61 The majority argued that this interpretation even  
 
 
 51. Id. at 407. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 413. 
 54. Id. at 409; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2006). 
 55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346. 
 56. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 409–10. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 410. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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stands up to the Skilling62 decision, as bribes and kickbacks do not 
necessitate a fiduciary relationship either.63 
The majority’s final point of reasoning was that the language of § 
1346 already suggests five limitations on its use,64 implying that 
these are the only limitations in place. According to the majority, § 
1346 requires (1) that a “legally enforceable right to have another 
provide honest services” exists; (2) that honesty was “inherent in the 
services performed by the perpetrator”; (3) that the perpetrator had 
the “intent to defraud”; (4) that the scheme used fraud; and (5) that 
the mail was “used to further the scheme.”65 The court held that if 
these limitations are met, then the conduct constitutes honest 
services mail fraud.66 
The dissent stated that the majority’s legislative intent argument 
is flawed.67 It argued that the majority was mistaken when it 
reasoned that Congress must not have intended there to be a 
fiduciary duty requirement because it did not explicitly state so in § 
1346. The dissent reasoned that, in reality, Congress did not include 
a reference to the fiduciary duty requirement because in 1988, when 
Congress passed the honest services fraud statute in response to 
McNally v. United States,68 it assumed that all previous case law on 
honest services fraud was in place.69 The dissent explained that 
“legislatures act with case law in mind,”70 and the case law on honest 
services fraud at this point more often than not discussed the 
requirement for a fiduciary relationship breach.71 The dissent stated 
that in this regard, the fact that Congress did not explicitly state that 
a breach of a fiduciary relationship was not necessary—knowing that 
the majority of courts called for proof of the relationship and breach 
thereof—is indication that it intended for the relationship to be 
 
 62. United States v. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010) (holding that honest 
services fraud must involve bribes or kickbacks). Skilling is further discussed supra Part II.B.2. 
 63. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 411. 
 64. Id. at 412. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 413. 
  67. Id. 
 68. 483 U.S. 350 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100–690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4508. 
 69. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 413–14. 
 70. Id. at 414 n.2 (quoting Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 988 (2009)). 
 71. Id. at 414–15. 
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required.72 The dissent also reasoned that the heightened sense of 
duty required in honest services fraud simply was not present in the 
Milovanovic facts.73 
Currently, the case is set to be reheard by the Ninth Circuit en 
banc.74 
IV. ANALYSIS 
As the majority opinion notes, there was already a circuit split on 
whether a fiduciary relationship was required at the time of the 
Milovanovic decision.75 This is an important federal question. Should 
a case reach the Supreme Court of the United States on this matter, 
it seems likely the Court would grant a writ of certiorari to straighten 
out this significant unsettled area of the law. There are persuasive 
textual and legislative history arguments both against and for 
requiring a fiduciary relationship. Policy considerations, however, tip 
the balance in favor of the fiduciary relationship requirement. The 
Ninth Circuit decided this case incorrectly by failing to consider the 
effects such a decision would have on society in its analysis. The 
Ninth Circuit should have held that honest services fraud necessitates 
proof of a fiduciary relationship based on policy considerations—
specifically the dangers of discriminatory prosecution, disrespect for 
the law, and over-regulation of the private sector. 
A. Discretion and Discrimination 
By eliminating the fiduciary relationship requirement, the court 
has afforded prosecutors an inappropriate amount of discretion. 
Wider prosecutorial discretion opens the door to discriminatory 
application, as prosecutors are more able to pick and choose 
defendants based on factors such as notoriety or race.  
The majority opinion in Milovanovic references the purpose of 
the honest services fraud statute, which is to prevent and punish 
fraud.76 The flexibility granted by the statute enables prosecutors to 
penalize conduct that does not exactly fall under other criminal 
statutes. Federal prosecutors are responsible for prosecuting “all 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 415–16. 
 74. United States v. Milovanovic, 655 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 75. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 409. 
 76. Id. at 410. 
HUNTER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  11:45 AM 
509 United States v. Milovanovic 
 519 
offenses against the United States,” yet gaps in the law often require 
them to use their discretion “in almost every task [they] 
perform[].”77 Prosecutors are afforded such discretion because they 
review a large number of cases, which involves scrutinizing various 
pieces of evidence, various actors, and so on, thus, they are assumed 
to be in the best position possible to decide whether or not to file 
charges. Such abounding discretion allows prosecutors to weed out 
weaker cases. In situations where prosecutors decide it is in the best 
interest of justice to prosecute, they rely on this statutory flexibility 
to do so. Thus, the mail and wire fraud statutes, referred to as the 
government’s “first line of defense,” are the prosecutor’s go-to 
statutes.78 
Given this substantial amount of discretion with which 
prosecutors pursue cases, it seems dangerous to afford them more 
discretion than is functionally required. Prosecutors’ practical needs 
are already being met with such a flexible and oft-applied statute; 
there is certainly no need to expand the statute’s already far-reaching 
scope. The courts have always been concerned about allowing the 
mail fraud statute to encompass far too much activity,79 and by 
eliminating the fiduciary relationship requirement in honest services 
fraud, the Ninth Circuit may have made this concern a reality. 
By giving such broad power to prosecutors, courts have opened 
the door to systemic abuse. Prosecutors anxious for headlines may be 
tempted to use the honest services statute against high profile 
political figures and CEOs who are guilty of unethical, but not 
necessarily criminal, behavior.80 As Justice Scalia complained in Sorich 
v. United States, the honest services fraud statute “invites abuse by 
headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state 
legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of 
unappealing or ethically questionable conduct.”81 This argument is 
 
 77. Alexa Lawson-Remer, Note, Rightful Prosecution or Wrongful Prosecution? Abuse of 
Honest Services Fraud for Political Purpose, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1311 (2009) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 547 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405–06 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 79. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 414. In 1876, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t would 
certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, 
and who should be set at large.” United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876). 
 80. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
 81. Id. 
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especially strong in light of honest services fraud prosecution in the 
private sector. While public officials have an inherent duty to 
preserve the public’s interests, this duty is not the same in the private 
sector where relationships are less valued. Relationships in the private 
sector are subject to much less loyalty and consideration; private 
actors often act in their own best interest when it is adverse to 
others’ interests. The phrase “it’s just good business” is frequently 
used to explain away various betrayals and ethical quagmires. 
Such broad discretion also opens up opportunities for 
prosecutors to abuse their positions in order to indulge their 
prejudices. It is a sad reality that the justice system is not void of 
actors who discriminate based on race, gender, religion, and so 
on82—there are surely prosecutors who, when given the opportunity, 
would unfairly prey on certain classes of people. 
The statute as applied by most courts is already broad, even 
taking into account the recent limitations imposed by Skilling. While 
requiring a fiduciary duty may or may not limit the honest services 
fraud statute depending on how “fiduciary duty” is defined,83 it is 
too risky to eliminate it altogether as the Ninth Circuit did. The 
Ninth Circuit recklessly disregarded such policy concerns and 
practical realities when deciding Milovanovic.84 
B. Over-Criminalization and Disrespect for the Law 
In addition to the discriminatory problems that often accompany 
wide discretionary powers, a broader reading of § 1346 would result 
in over-criminalization of the private sector. Already, interpretations 
of § 1346 seem to imply that mere unethical behavior by an 
employee is enough to prosecute him or her. United States v. 
Bronston is a good example of the statute’s overreach into ethical—
but not criminal—violations.85 In Bronston, a Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals case, the defendant Samuel Bronston was a New York 
state senator and partner at a local law firm.86 The law firm began to 
 
 82. See generally CYNDI BANKS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(2d ed. 2009). 
 83. Justice Scalia made sure to scoff at the “indeterminacy” of the term “fiduciary duty” 
in his Skilling concurrence. United States v. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2937 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 84. See generally Milovanovic, 627 F.3d at 407–13. 
 85. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 86. Id. at 922. 
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represent two venture capital companies investing in BusTop 
Shelters, Inc. (“BusTop”).87 A friend and current client of Bronston 
named Saul Steinberg asked Bronston to represent him in an effort 
to acquire BusTop, but Bronston’s firm prohibited Bronston from 
representing Steinberg due to a conflict of interest.88 Bronston 
proceeded to represent the client in secret.89 Because Bronston failed 
to disclose the conflict of interest to the firm’s venture capitalist 
clients, he was subsequently convicted of honest services fraud for 
this ethical violation.90 
Bronston is regarded as the high-water-mark case for honest 
services mail fraud, and it is widely criticized for over-criminalizing 
the private sector.91 Such over-criminalization leads to increasing 
disrespect and disregard for the law.92 Furthermore, over-
criminalization often leads to violations of individual freedoms.93 The 
government interest in expanding this catch-all provision is low, and 
the resulting government encroachment on daily life that will surely 
result from Milovanovic trumps this interest. The Ninth Circuit 
either failed to contemplate or completely avoided discussing these 
negative consequences and important policy considerations in 
Milovanovic. 
C. Over-Regulation Effects on the Economy 
The government has already shown its willingness to “polic[e] 
the internal affairs of corporations” by criminalizing some corporate 
fiduciary obligations.94 By eliminating the fiduciary relationship 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 923. 
 90. Id. at 930. 
 91. See Coffee, supra note 16, at 434. 
 92. See Sanford Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 157, 160 (1967). The Prohibition Era is a prime example of over-criminalization 
leading to rampant disrespect for the law. See generally Harry Gene Levine, The Birth of 
American Alcohol Control: Prohibition, the Power Elite, and the Problem of Lawlessness, 12 
CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 63 (1985). Some would argue that current criminal laws designed to 
prohibit drug use have yielded the same disrespect. See Ronald Bayer, Introduction: The Great 
Drug Policy Debate–What Means This Thing Called Decriminalization?, 69 MILBANK Q. 341 
(1991). 
 93. Fernando Molina, A Comparison Between Continental European and Anglo-
American Approaches to Overcriminalization and Some Remarks for How to Deal with It, 14 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 123, 136 (2011). 
 94. Peter R. Ezerksy, Note, Intra-corporate Mail and Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability for 
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requirement for honest services fraud and effectively expanding the 
statute’s scope, the Milovanovic decision has created more 
opportunity for the government to regulate corporate affairs. An 
increase in regulation in the private sector will have negative 
economic effects because “the heightened possibility of liability . . . 
for business failure or suspect loyalty is likely to magnify the already 
excessive risk-aversion of corporate managers—or cause them to 
demand increased compensation to offset the risk of criminal 
liability—and thereby reduce returns to shareholders.”95 Such 
regulation is not an appropriate responsibility of the federal 
government. Congress has charged the states with substantive 
regulation of intracorporate affairs96 while federal law has only 
spoken to the mandatory disclosure of securities sales and 
exchanges.97 It is no secret that states scheme and compete with one 
another to come up with the most beneficial laws for companies in 
hopes to attract business.98 Such interstate competition is typical of 
the free market and is healthy for the private sector—it leads to self-
correction in corporate state law as states each work to find the 
optimal amount of regulation to satisfy both business owners and 
other constituents such as environmentalists.99 This optimal amount 
of regulation would be jeopardized if the federal government began 
to regulate corporate behavior more aggressively using broad wire 
and mail fraud statutes. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to expand the honest services fraud 
statute beyond the point of necessity is one more step in the 
direction of over-regulation. As prosecutors exercise this new, 
broader authority to prosecute honest services mail fraud, these 
negative effects of over-regulation will not take long to materialize. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the majority opinion in Milovanovic accurately points out 
that where a statute is sufficiently clear, the court does not need to 
 
Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427, 1442 (1985). 
 95. Id. at 1439. 
 96. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). 
 97. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
 98. See Ezerksy, supra note 94, at 1442–43. 
 99. See id. at 1443. 
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look further than the language,100 it takes for granted that the honest 
services fraud statute is clear. In reality, the honest services fraud 
statute is incredibly vague, as is evident by its almost-demise in 
Skilling. If not for Justice Ginsburg’s creative interpretation of  § 
1346, it would surely have been struck down.101 The Ninth Circuit 
did not decide Milovanovic correctly, as it failed to properly 
contemplate the policy considerations of discrimination, over-
criminalization, and over-regulation of the private sector. 
The honest services fraud statute has already been distorted 
beyond its original form to serve as a catch-all for most instances of 
fraud. The Ninth Circuit has enabled prosecutors to use the statute 
even more frequently than before, and—as history has shown—if 
prosecutors can use a statute, they do. When the Ninth Circuit 
rehears Milovanovic en banc, it should reverse its original holding 
and find that a fiduciary relationship is in fact a requirement for 


















 100. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 
(2000); Burton v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 196 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 1999); City of 
Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 101. United States v. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010). 
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